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JOHN F. KLEIN-ROBBENHAAR"

Balancing Efficiency with Equity:
Determining the Public Welfare in
Surface Water Transfers from Acequia
Communities
ABSTRACT
As mandated by New Mexico statute, a transfer of surface
water rightsfrom one appropriatorto another,or from one particular
use to another, must not violate the public welfare. While the public
welfare is a flexible concept and may vary from region to region,
neither the State Engineer Office nor the state legislaturehas defined
what the public welfare constitutes or indicated when the public
welfare is violated. Failure to define the public welfare places rural
acequia communities in danger of losing control of their water
resources. The essay suggests changes which are designed to better
safeguard the interests of northern New Mexico acequia
communities. The specific recommendations are: (1) establish a clear
burden of proof in transfer proceedings; (2) clarify the SEO's Intel
decision; (3) require of a transfer applicant a "public welfare impact
statement"; and (4) permit acequias to form conservation
organizationsto protect acequia water rights. The recommendations
are intended to strengthen the local and regional planning process
by empowering communities and counties to maintain control of
their water in the face of swift economic change.
"The West is defined .

.

.

by inadequate rainfall ... We can't create

water, or increase the supply. We can only hold back and
redistributewhat there is."
-Wallace Stegner
INTRODUCTION
Today in the western states, the move is on to reallocate scarce
water from agriculture to industry. The utilitarian argument which
supports this redistribution claims that, gallon for gallon, industrial uses
of water are more "efficient" than traditional agricultural uses because
* John F. Klein-Robbenhaar received his J.D. from the University of New Mexico
School of Law in May 1995, and was awarded the "Certificate in Natural Resources" for
completion of the Natural Resources Law Program. Mr. Klein-Robbenhaar holds a master's
degree in Latin American Studies, and resides and practices law in Albuquerque, New
Mexico.
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industry can employ far greater numbers of people than does flood
irrigation. In a time of rapid population growth and tremendous
expansion of western urban centers, the need to provide urban jobs leads
many to the conclusion that small agriculturalists will have to succumb
to the pressures of economic change. Rural agricultural communities
throughout the western states will undoubtedly experience enormous
pressures in coming years as developers and planners focus their
attention on rural communities' water rights.
New Mexico's unique historical, cultural and political landscape
makes water rights transfers in this state more problematic than in other
states. Particularly in northern New Mexico, where water transfers
generally move from Indian and Hispanic users to urban and industrial
uses, water management initiatives tend to threaten the "complex and
fragile web of communal uses," or threaten to deprive Native Americans
or Hispanics of control over their future.' While the utilitarian argument
is grounded in economics and points to economic benefits to be gained
by transferring water to industry from agriculture, its implicit
shortcoming lies in the fact that it does not adequately account for New
Mexico's unique cultural and historical concerns. "The prime value of
agriculture in this region [northern New Mexico] is cultural" comments
one study. "It is the basis of a traditional way of life for ethnic
communities that are proud of their histories and have a high level of
interest in maintaining their historic way of life despite pressures for
change."2 The importance of respecting the cultural value of water forms
the core of this essay's argument.
Economic modernization confronted the economic, social, and
cultural traditions of a small northern New Mexican community in the
early 1980s. The Tierra Grande Corporation sought to transfer water
rights from the community of Ensenada, New Mexico to a large ski
development located upstream from the community. The Ensenada Land
and Water Association, representing members of an agricultural
community, objected to the permit application, alleging impairment of
existing rights and a violation of the public interest. Pursuant to New
Mexico statutes which controlled at the time,3 the State Engineer Office
(SEO) held a hearing on the water transfer application, but refused to
hear evidence on whether the application was contrary to the public
welfare. In response, the Ensenada Land and Water Association refused
to put on any evidence at the administrative hearing, feeling that the
hearing was tainted. Upon the SEO's expected approval of the proposed
1. NATIONAL RESOURCES COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS INTHE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 163 (1992).

2.Id. at 168.

3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985).
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transfer, the Association appealed to the district court.'
Judge Art Encinias, a New Mexico district court judge sitting in
Tierra Amarilla, heard the appeal in which the appellants made several
impairment claims, the most important being that the proposed transfer
would be contrary to the public welfare.' The Ensenada Association put
forth expert testimony that the development would provide only menial
jobs, and the local residents would never see any benefits from the resort
economy.6 The Tierra Grande Corporation disagreed, contending that
the proposed development would be in the public interest because it
would stimulate the local economy by generating construction jobs in the
building of second homes, and by promoting the tourist industry.
Overall, argued the Corporation, the development project would allow
the local "poverty-stricken populace" to shift from an agricultural
subsistence economy to one based on tourism.8
Judge Encinias disagreed with the "astonishing argument" that
the SEO need not hear evidence on the public interest issue9 and
reversed the SEO's approval of the water transfer to hold that evidence
on the public interest must be considered in surface water transfer cases.
Judge Encinias stated:
I am persuaded that to transfer water rights, devoted for more
than a century to agricultural purposes, in order to construct
a playground for those who can pay is a poor trade, indeed.
I find that the proposed transfer of water rights is clearly
contrary to the public interest 10and, on that separate basis, the
Application should be denied.
While the case was pending before Judge Encinias, the New
Mexico state legislature amended section 72-5-23 to mandate that the SEO
consider whether a water transfer application would be "detrimental to
the public welfare."" Denying this statute's retroactive application,
however, the court of appeals reversed Judge Encinias, holding that, prior
to the amendment, the public interest or public welfare was not a

4. For a thorough discussion of the dispute between the Tierra Grande Corporation
and the Ensenada Land and Water Association, see Shannon A. Parden, Note: The Milagro
Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada Land and Water Association v. Sleeper. Public Welfare Defies
Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 861 (1989).
5. Id. at 865.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. In re Application of Sleeper, No. RA 84-53(C) (N.M. District Ct., April 16, 1985),
rev'd., 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. quashed, 759 P.2d 200 (N.M. 1988).
10. Id. at 7.
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985).
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relevant factor in denying a water rights application. 2
It is a safe bet that pressures on northern New Mexican
community ditch associations, like those felt by the Ensenada Land and
Water Association, will be pronounced in coming years due to the
region's projected economic growth and its evolving notions of the best
use of water. This essay addresses the issue of how to determine when
the "public welfare" has been violated in the context of transferring water
from a community ditch to outside uses. After briefly introducing
important background information on acequias, the paper presents an
historical discussion of the incorporation of public interest values into
western water codes with a look at modern approaches taken by other
western states. It then discusses the issue of statutory interpretation since
the term "public welfare" appears in numerous New Mexico water law
Lastly, the essay makes
statutes but is nowhere defined. 3
recommendations which may safeguard the viability of economically poor
acequia communities. Given the unique situation presented by northern
New Mexico's community acequias, the essay is limited to addressing the
public welfare issue as posed by these communities.
WATER USE AND ACEQUIAS: SOME BACKGROUND
In New Mexico, water transfers present the greatest promise to
continued economic development in the Rio Grande basin, but they also
pose the most serious threats to small agricultural communities. Surface
water, which is almost fully appropriated in New Mexico, 4 irrigates
over 400,000 acres of land, or just under a third of all agricultural
cropland in the state. 5 A compelling argument can be made that, in
order to promote economic growth in the West, some of that water
dedicated to agriculture, particularly that used on small-scale flood
irrigation farms, should be transferred to industrial uses in order to
employ greater numbers of people. Surface water transfers may permit
population centers in northern New Mexico to expand, but they also may
promote the disintegration of small rural communities and signal the end
of an agrarian tradition unique to northern New Mexico.
Northern New Mexico is an area which deserves special attention

12. Sleeper, 760 P.2d at 790-92.
13. See infra note 55.
14. See Michelle Minnis and Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: Determining
Public Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 817, 827 (1989).
15. ROBERT R. LANSFORD ET AL., NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, SOURCES OF IRRIGATION

WATER AND IRRIGATED AND DRY CROPLAND ACREAGES INNEW MEXICO, BY COUNTY, 1986-88,
at 5 (1989). In 1988, total irrigated cropland in New Mexico amounted to 1,460,710 acres. Id.
at 6.
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when formulating a policy for water rights transfers. Early Spanish
settlements in the upper Rio Grande valley have depended on the
diversion of surface water to irrigate low-lying valley lands for over 300
years. The construction of acequias, or agricultural ditches, was usually
the initial project any fledgling community undertook. Clearly, without
the acequia and the agriculture it supported, the expansion of Spanish
settlement in arid regions like New Mexico would have been unthinkable.
The fact that Spaniards outnumbered Native Americans in New Mexico
in 1811 by two to one 16 reflects in part the important role played by the
acequia in supporting human settlement in the region.
The importance of the acequia to the survival of present-day
Hispanic communities must not be understated as the acequia still plays
a vital role in numerous northern New Mexico villages. Well-known
writer Stanley Crawford, a mayordomo17 of a northern New Mexican
community acequia, has written widely on the unique function of the
acequia in Hispanic village life.'" Crawford remarks that "the acequia is
a reason to come together, to cooperate. People don't have to like each
other, but they have to know each other, and to work together.""'
Statements like Crawford's highlight the central role played by the
acequia in the community: rather than being a simple ditch transporting
water from point A to point B, the acequia forms an association of people
whose mutual survival depends on the continued community use of a
shared resource.
One's membership in an acequia carries with it a social contract
mandating that members contribute to the acequia's maintenance. Each
spring, for example, individuals who rely on the acequia to divert surface
water to their fields assemble on a given day. With shovels in hand, they
rework the acequia, cleaning brush, removing silt and debris, repairing
diversion headgates, and shoring up embankments and earthen dams.
Depending on the acequia's length and on the damage which occurred
over the winter, the cleaning may last up to several days, with workers
proceeding section by section until the entire acequia is completed. One
observer comments:

16. JOHN 0. BAXTER, SPANISH IRRIGATION IN TAOS VALLEY 15-16 (1990).

17. A mayordomo is an elected official who oversees the maintenance of the acequia
and distribution of its waters. A mayordomo is generally a respected individual within an
acequia community, one to whom individuals can turn to solve disputes surrounding the
use of scarce water. In times of shortage, a mayordomo would traditionally spread the
shortage to all users rather than allowing those first on the ditch to get their full share.
18. STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORtOMO: CHRONICLE OF AN ACEQUIA IN NORTHERN NEW

MEXICO (1988).
19. Camille Flores-Turney, Will the Aciquias Survive? Future of Village Life Hangs by a
Slender Thread, N.M. MAGAZINE, May 1994, at 52.
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From this relation has grown a communal existence that is
both physical and social. It doesn't matter if the ditch serves
three families, 30 families, or 300, the result is the
same-physical and cultural survival is and always has been
dependent on the ditches."
By carrying out the "limpia," or cleaning, the community
guarantees each individual member's right to share in the community's
waters. The cleaning strengthens social bonds among community
members, and reaffirms a member's place within the village. Northern
New Mexico's many acequias are clearly unique in the arid Southwest by
playing a crucial role in preserving cultural identity and community
cohesion.
Currently, there are between 800 and 1000 acequia associations
in the state of New Mexico, 1 with approximately 700 located in
north-central New Mexico. The greatest numbers are found in the
northern counties of Mora, Rio Arriba, Santa Fe, San Miguel, and Taos.'
It is estimated that, state-wide, acequias provide irrigation water to about
160,000 acres on approximately 12,000 farms, seventy percent of which
average less than twenty acres in size.' The irrigated acreage on the
12,000 farms varies from less than one acre to over 500, although the
average in northern New Mexico tends to be in the 10 to 20 acre range.24
Water transfers pose a direct threat to the stability of small
communities which depend upon the acequia. As is permitted under
New Mexico law, the owner of a water right may sever the water from
the land so that it may be used elsewhere by another user for a similar
When one member of an acequia sells or
or different purpose.'
transfers his water rights to outside users, however, third-party effects
felt by other acequia members can be severe.
Since a given ditch system must be maintained by the
collective labor of its users of [sic] parciantes, each time a
parcel loses its water rights, a proportional amount of labor
and ditch fees is also lost to the system as a whole, thereby
increasing the burden of maintenance upon the remaining
parciantes. Each member is a link in the chain of community

20. Orlando Romero, Las Acequias, N.M. MAGAZINE, Mar. 1979, at 30.
21. AU DON TRUyILLO, SouTHWEsT HISPANIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GROUP

CREDIT: A
MECHANISM TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AMONG NEW MEXICO'S COMMUNITY
ACEQUIA ASSOCIATIONS 3 (1983); PHIL LOVATO, LAS ACEQUIAS DEL NORTE 1 (1974). Trujillo

counts 819 acequias, while Lovato states there exist "more than a thousand."
22. Lovato, supra note 21, at 1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985).
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water use and control, and each time a member and his quota
of water and labor are lost, the overall chain is weakened.'
The immediate third-party effect is greater labor costs, which may force
those remaining in the acequia to eventually transfer or sell water rights
against their wishes. Those lower on the ditch, not surprisingly, are most
vulnerable. A community's failure to maintain control over its water
resources results in the inevitable weakening of social bonds and the
inexorable process of community disintegration.'
WESTERN WATER LAW'S INCORPORATION OF PUBLIC
INTEREST VALUES
The "public interest" emerged as a concept in western water law
at the turn of the 20th century, being mentioned in the context of water
law in Wyoming in 1890. In that year, Wyoming passed legislation which
required new water appropriators to obtain a permit from the state and,
at the same time, authorized the SEO to deny proposed appropriations
which were detrimental to the public interest.'
The Wyoming
legislature, however, failed to define the public interest, leaving this task
to the Wyoming courts.
In 1910, the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court addressed the
issue of the public interest in the context of a proposed irrigation
project.' The Territorial Court stated that the public interest would be
harmed if (1) granting a permit to a smaller irrigation project, despite its
lower cost per acre foot of water, would preclude a larger, feasible
project,' and if (2) granting a permit for a large irrigation project which
subsequently failed would scare off future investors.3 Clearly, the
Territorial Court defined the public interest in terms of economic
development, and overlooked potential contradictions between feasibility
and maximum efficiency.
Similar reasoning was used in subsequent years by other Western
state courts. In Cookinham v. Lewis et al., 2 the Oregon court affirmed the
SEQ's denial of a permit for a project that would stand in the way of a

26. Sylvia Rodriguez, Land, Water, and Ethnic Identity in Taos, in LAND, WATER, AND
CULTURE: NEW PERSPECrIVES ON HISPANIC LAND GRANTS 313, 356 (1987).
27. See generally F. LEE BROWN AND HELEN INGRAM, WATER AND POVERTY IN THE
SOUTHWEST (1987); Rodriguez, supra note 26.
28. See CHARLES J. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 12-15 (1971).
29. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
30. Id. at 1050.

31. Id.
32. 114 P. 88, 91 (Or. 1911), reh'g denied, 115 P. 342 (Or. 1911).
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larger project to reclaim arid lands. In 1913, the Nebraska Supreme Court
ruled that the public interest is served by the promotion of irrigation
projects and, if possible, by avoiding litigation so as to further that
goal.3 And in 1915 the Wyoming court reported a permit decision
where the SEO had ruled that water development violated the public
interest if it interfered with mining operations.', The Wyoming SEO
found that opportunities for electrical power development throughout the
state were numerous, and therefore an application to proceed with a
hydroelectric project along the Big Horn River should not prevent
mineral development which promised greater public benefits.'
These early decisions occurred during the era of reclamation
when settling the arid west and making the desert "bloom" was a federal
priority, leading the courts to define the public interest in terms of
economic development. Competing and smaller projects that would
impede maximum economic development were deemed to violate the
public interest. Little to no consideration in these years was given to
water conservation, environmental preservation, or public health and
recreation. The economic development approach to determine when a
proposed water use would comport with the public interest was adhered
to throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Indeed, because western water
codes had always required that water be put to "beneficial use," few gave
the seemingly redundant issue of "public welfare" much attention. Then
in 1966 Alaska enacted a water use act which required the SEO to
consider the public interest when deciding on new uses for water. Most
progressive of the Alaska act was its attempt to define the "public
interest."
MODERN PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW
Alaska's legislation' marks the emergence of the "modern era"
in public interest review by expressly accounting for public values in new
water appropriations. In Alaska, eight criteria are to be considered in
deciding whether a new appropriation should be approved:
1.
The benefits to the applicant resulting from the proposed
appropriation;
2.
The effect of the economic activity resulting from the proposed
appropriation;
3.
The effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational
opportunities;

33. In Re Commonwealth Power Co., 143 N.W. 937, 938-39 (Neb. 1913).
34. Big Horn Power Co. v. State of Wyoming, 148 P. 1110 (Wyo. 1915).
35. Id. at 1111-12.
36. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b) (1984).
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The effect on public health;
The effect of losses of alternative uses of water that might be
made within a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by
the proposed appropriation;
Harm to other persons resulting from the proposed
6.
appropriation;
The intent and ability of the applicant to complete the
7.
appropriation; and
8.
The effect upon access to navigable or public waters.37
Despite its attempt at clarification, the Alaska statute nevertheless
lacks detail on how to apply the eight criteria. When benefits to the
applicant outweigh harm to third parties, for example, is not determined.
This is largely because its author, water law scholar Frank J. Trelease,
saw the benefit of allowing new appropriations to proceed on a case by
case basis. In a report which accompanied the legislation, Trelease
commented that decisions concerning new appropriations in Alaska "will
be difficult." Trelease opined: "No economic formula can solve these
problems by push button techniques... the balancing of benefits against
cost must be performed by the exercise of judgment."
Idaho has taken an approach similar to Alaska's in that it too has
tried to define as precisely as possible the various factors which
constitute "public welfare and conservation." The Director of Water
Resources in Idaho has drawn on Idaho statutes and cases to compile the
following list of elements which go into the public welfare equation:
1. Fish and wildlife habitat;
2. Aquatic beauty;
3. Aesthetic beauty;
4. Transportation and navigation;
5. Water quality;
6. Benefit to the applicant;
7. Economic effect;
8. Loss of alternative uses;
9. Harm to others;
10. Effect upon navigation and public waters;
11. Intent and ability of the applicant to complete the appropriation;
12. Assuring minimum instream flows;
13. Discouraging waste;
14. Encouraging conservation; and
4.
5.

37. Id.
38. FRANK

J. TRELEASE, A WATER CODE FOR ALASKA,

A REPORT TO THE STATE OF ALASKA

14-17, excerptedin CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 138-40 (Frank J.Trelease & George
A. Gould eds., 4th ed. 1986).
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15. Any locally important factor.3
As in the Alaska example, however, Idaho offers no formula by which
one applies and weighs the factors. Indeed, the Director of Water
Resources has added that the list is not all-inclusive but rather "[itis the
role of the hearing officer to attempt to obtain a record from which the
decision-maker can balance consideration of all of these and any other
important factors."4° Clearly, in both Alaska and Idaho, appropriation for
water uses will proceed on a case by case basis.
Sixteen of eighteen western states have enacted statutes which
incorporate to varying degrees public interest review of transfers and
new appropriations.4' While these statutes signal criteria which
administrative agencies may apply when determining whether a new
water use comports with the values of society, none precisely defines the
notion of the "public welfare." Arizona recognizes the general need to
stabilize and protect the economy and welfare of the state,42 while
California's water code permits development of water resources for the
greatest public benefit, as long as the use is reasonable, beneficial, and in
the public interest.' By promoting maximum economic development,
Oregon's statute examines factors such as adequate drainage, sanitation,
flood control, water availability, and the prevention of wasteful,
uneconomic, impracticable or unreasonable uses." Even though
Colorado's statutes mention neither public welfare nor public interest,
they do promote conservation and prevention of waste, as well as water
quality standards and instream flow.4' Montana similarly promotes
overall economic benefits, water conservation, water quality, instream
flow, and the prevention of waste.' Generally, the Utah SEO may not
approve an application to utilize water which is detrimental to the public

39. Keith Higginson, Address at The Public Interest: A Matter of Discretion? Innovation
in Western Water Law and Management Conference (June 5-7, 1991).
40. Id. (emphasis in original).
41. ALASKA STAT. %§46.15.040, .080(a) (1984 & Supp. 1986); ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN.§
45-142, -143 (Supp. 1986); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1225,1255 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO
CODE % 42-210, -203A, -203C (Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-705, -711 (1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-302, -311(2) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-232.02, -233, -234 (1986); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 533.325, .370(3), 534.050(1) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-1, -6, -7, 72-12-3(E)
(Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-02, -06 (1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 537.130, .170(4) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 46-1-15, -2A-9, -5-10, -6-3 (1983); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.121, .134(3) (West Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1, -8(1)
(1980 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.250, .03.290, .44.050, .44.060 (West
1962); WYO. STAT. §§ 41-4-503, -3-930 to -932 (1977 & Supp. 1986).
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-142, -143, -292(C) (Supp. 1986).
43. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1225, 1255 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987).
44. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537,030 (1985).
45. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1-101 (1990).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1-302, -311(2) (1985).
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welfare." Nebraska sets out several considerations, the last of which is
"lalny other factors consistent with the purposes of this section that the
director deems relevant to protecting the interest of the state and its
citizens. "'
In summary, it seems that the above statutes reflect four
approaches to defining the "public welfare." The first approach is to do
nothing and not define the public welfare. Utah, despite its statutory
mandate that water appropriations may not be to the detriment of the
public welfare, has deliberately pursued this approach -proceeding on
a case by case basis with the SEO free to consider any number of
considerations. The second approach is to list, by statute or regulation,
factors to be considered in a public welfare inquiry, as done by Idaho and
Alaska. A third approach, followed by Texas, gives weight to the various
factors, and establishes preferences among them. 9 The fourth approach
centers on the water planning process, either at the state, regional, or
county level. New Mexico presently adheres to this fourth approach.'
Regardless of which of the four approaches an individual state
follows, an element shared by all western states is the understanding that
new water uses must take the "public interest" into account. The modern
era is marked by western states forsaking standard "reclamation era"
notions of water use and accounting for new values of how to best use
the West's most valuable resource. While an ongoing debate in the
literature centers on whether water should be treated as a commodity,
subject to the forces of the market, or as a social good unreachable by
market forces, it appears that westerners are not entirely ready to
embrace unfettered water trade where the highest bidder wins.5' The
move to incorporate public welfare concerns into the water transfer
equation reflects society's unease with how it will distribute a finite
natural resource in the face of rapid economic growth. Since water is
different from, say, coal or oil because it is a requirement of all life,
westerners may be unprepared to give the market exclusive control over
the future of their water. But it is apparent that they are also unprepared
to forego development in order to protect "inefficient" uses of water. The

47. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1, -8(1) (1980 & Supp. 1986).

48. NEB. REV. STAT, § 46-232.02 (1984).
49. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (West 1977).
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Michie 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1994). For a brief discussion
of the four approaches, see Martha C. Franks, Office of the New Mexico State Engineer, The
Meaning of "Public Welfare" in Water Law 17-23 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Natural Resources Journal).
51. For a general discussion of the debate between the public welfare and commodity
views of water transfers, see Charles T. DuMars and A. Dan Tarlock, Symposium Introduction:
New Challenges to State Water Allocation Sovereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 331 (1989).
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extent to which the West will allow water to be controlled by market
forces remains to be seen.
TRANSFERS AND NEW MEXICO STATUTES
Water rights transfers in New Mexico from one point of diversion
to another require approval from the SEO.5 To approve a transfer of
a surface water right, the SEO must determine that the transfer will not
impair the rights of other users.' Importantly, the SEO must also
determine that the transfer of a water right within the state of New
Mexico does not violate the "public welfare" of the citizens of the state.5
no statutory definition in New Mexico of the
In 1995, there existed
"public welfare, "s and public welfare determinations proceed on a
case-by-case basis. Moreover, it appears that the SEO's policy is to let
individual counties determine how to define "public welfare."
In a presentation on the subject of the public welfare, the New
Mexico State Engineer hypothetically asked whether it is proper "for one
individual to sit in Santa Fe and decide what is best in terms of public
welfare for the entire state."' Responding in the negative, the State
Engineer acknowledged that a definition of public welfare in the context
of water transfers for mining purposes, for example, would vary
considerably depending on whether one spoke with residents of Taos or
Silver City. The theory behind the SEO's approach is that those making
the decisions should be knowledgeable of, affected by, and concerned
with water development in the area. The SEQ's approach is supported by
New Mexico's statutory guidelines which emphasize regional planning
of water development decisions.57
A recent expression of the SEO's policy emerged in June, 1994,
concerning the Intel Corporation's application to appropriate
groundwater. The SEO suggested that compliance with New Mexico
law's beneficial use requirements in itself satisfies a public welfare

1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985)
53. Id.
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985).
55. The term "public welfare" appears in at least 149 New Mexico statutes. For
references to "public welfare" in New Mexico's water law statutes, see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
72-1-9; 72-5-5; 72-5-5.1; 72-5-6; 72-5-7; 72-5-23; 72-5-24; 72-9-2; 72-12-3; 72-12-7; 72-12B-1;
72-14-44; 72-16-1 (Michie 1978).
56. State Engineer Eluid Martinez, Current Ideas for New Mexico Water Planning,
Speech at the 37th Annual New Mexico Water Conference (Nov. 5-6, 1992), in NEW MExIco
52. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23, 72-5-24 (Michie

WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WRRI REPORT No. 273, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 37TH
ANNUAL NEW MEXICO WATER CONFERENCE, MULTICULTURAL, MULTIUSE: PLANNING NEW

MEXICO'S WATER RESOURCES FUTURE 15 (1993).

57. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-14-1 & -22 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985).
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inquiry. Finding that the "right to a new appropriation or reallocation of
water, if obtained pursuant to New Mexico water law, is not against the
public welfare, " the SEO held that a "statutorily recognized beneficial
use of water is not against the public welfare of the state." 59 The SEO
offered the following finding:
Decisions as to the type of development, i.e. growth, that is to
occur in a given geographical area and effects resulting from
that growth on the economy and physical infrastructure are
best determined by appropriate governmental entities through
°
local zoning and land development authority.W
Water development decisions, therefore, are to be made at the
local or county level, with individual counties encouraged to pass
planning and zoning resolutions and regulations as to what type of
development will be allowed or prohibited within their respective
counties. The county-by-county approach of the SEO may provide rural
acequia communities a greater degree of protection, as county
governments may pass resolutions, for example, which prohibit water
transfers from acequias to other uses and users, even if a neighboring
county's development strategy does not accord the acequias special
protection.61 While zoning and development regulations may vary from
county to county, presumably the SEO would be bound to follow the
county resolution.
It should be noted that the public welfare criterion was added to
New Mexico's water code in 1985, and therefore is an additional element
that the SEO must consider when deciding on new appropriations or
transfers of existing water rights. The SEO's finding in the Intel case, that
if a right to use water has been obtained pursuant to New Mexico water
law and is a statutorily recognized beneficial use, it per se comports with
the law's public welfare requirements, glosses over the fact that the
public welfare is a separate element to be considered, in addition to the
various requirements of New Mexico statutes. It is for the SEO, and not
for individual counties, to decide whether state law has been violated in
new appropriations or transfers. Unless the New Mexico legislature
re-delegates the task of approving water appropriations and transfers
from the SEO to county governments, a strong argument can be made
that the SEO has abdicated its responsibilities of overseeing the
58. In Re the Applications of Intel Corporation to Appropriate the Underground Waters
of the State of New Mexico in the Rio Grande Underground Water Basin, No. RG-57125,
RG-57125-S and RG-57125-S-2, at 14 (June 10, 1994) (Findings and Order).
59. Id.
60. Id. at Finding 53.
61. Telephone interview with David Benavides, attorney for Northern New Mexico
Legal Services, (Nov. 1994).
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administration of New Mexico's water resources.6 At the time of this
writing, there has been no review of the SEO's decisions in the Intel case.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF NEW MEXICO'S PUBLIC
WELFARE
As stated above, the phrase "public welfare" appears in at least
13 New Mexico water law statutes.' Nevertheless, applicants of water
rights transfers (or those protesting) have little guidance on how to
determine what the public welfare is and when it is violated. Because the
only case at the appellate court level to directly address public welfare
values in the context of acequias, Sleeper, was reversed on technical
grounds", New Mexico case law fails to settle the issue.' Thus, the
question becomes one of statutory interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of defining
the public interest in a case involving federal permit legislation. In
NAACP v. Federal Power Commission,' the NAACP filed suit against the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) for its failure to carry out the mandates
of the Federal Power Act by not affirmatively prohibiting discriminatory
practices on the part of its regulatees. Affirming the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court refused to broadly define the
mandate provided by the Act to the FPC. The Court stated: "This Court's
cases have consistently held that the use of the words 'public interest' in
a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general public
62. Id.
63. See supra note 55.
64. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987), cert.
quashed, 759 P.2d 200 (N.M. 1988).
65. In fact, the same district judge who decided the Sleeper case, Art Encinias,
considered public welfare considerations when he ordered the Sangre de Cristo Water
Company to release water to acequia members who could claim a priority date prior to the
utility's priority date. Judge Encinias held that the "interest of the public does not only
comprehend economic values but cultural, historic and aesthetic values." See Anaya v. Public
Service Company, No. SF 43-347 (First Jud. Dist. June 22, 1990) (order granting injunction).
Two recent decisions by the State Engineer address the issue of the public welfare. See In
Re Application of El Prado Water and Sanitation District for Permit to Change Point of
Diversion and Place and Purpose of Use from Surface to Groundwater within the Rio
Grande Underground Water Basin, File No. 057, 0932, 0933 (Subfile 9.4)-A-A; 057, 0931
(Sub-File 9.8)-A-A; 057, 0931, 0932, and 0933, at 10 (Apr. 30, 1992) (Findings and Order); In
Re Application of Pegasus Gold Corporation for a Temporary Permit to Engage in Mine
Dewatering, RG-50321, at 6. Each decision was dismissed on appeal to the district court. The
orders dismissing the appeals are, respectively: InRe Application of El Prado Water and
Sanitation District (Eighth Jud. Dist., Taos County Cause No. 92-135-CV) (order dismissing
appeal, Jan. 27, 1993), and In Re: Lac Minerals (USA), (First Jud. Dist., SF 92-1097-C) (order
dismissing appeal, Jan. 16, 1993).
66. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
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welfare. Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory
legislation."67
Following NAACP's narrow lead, we must look to the purposes
for which the act requiring public welfare review is adopted, as other
states have done when construing the public welfare in a water permit
context. A Washington statute, for example, prohibits appropriations
detrimental to the public welfare but does not define relevant factors. In
Stempel v. Department of Water Resources,0 the department argued that,
because the permit statute's public welfare criterion dated to a period
when pollution concerns were not considered by state legislatures, the
department need not consider water quality in relation to public welfare.
The Washington court rejected this argument, and referred to other pieces
of legislation which dealt with water quality to supplement the permit
statute. 0
A similar case occurred in Idaho where the Idaho Supreme Court
looked beyond the statute in question to discern the meaning of "public
welfare." 7' In this example, Idaho did not have a state environmental
policy act or a water resources act as did Washington. The Idaho court
nonetheless found legislation enacted on the same day as the statute
under review. The Idaho court stated that "common sense" dictates that
local public interest includes the factors outlined in the statute, as well as
other factors promoting water conservation.'1 The court found that "the
legislature intended to include any locally important factor impacted by
proposed appropriations. " ' The Idaho court noted that the "relevant
elements and their relevant weight will vary with local needs,
circumstances, and interests. ' r7
Because New Mexico's water transfer statute was enacted in 1985,
long after the reclamation era's emphasis on economic development, the
public welfare must be read in its modern context. What are the purposes
of the New Mexico statute governing water transfers? What other statutes
might we reference to ascertain the meaning of the "public welfare?"
Should the New Mexico SEO follow Idaho's lead and look to "locally
important factors" when deciding whether a surface water transfer from
an acequia community violates the public welfare?
Section 72-1-9 of New Mexico's statutes provides a statement on

67. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
68. 508 P.2d 166, 171 (Wash. 1973).
69. Id. at 171-72. The other pieces of legislation referenced by the Washington court
were the Washington State Environmental Policy Act and the Water Resources Act.
70. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448 (Idaho 1985).
71. Id. at 449.
72. Id. at 449-50 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 450.
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the meaning of the public welfare:
It is hereby recognized by the State of New Mexico that it
promotes the public welfare and the conservation of water
within the state for municipalities, counties and public utilities
supplying water to municipalities or counties to plan for the
reasonable development and use of water resources. The state
further recognizes the SEO's administrative policy of not
allowing municipalities and counties to acquire and hold,
unused, water rights in an amount greater than their
reasonable needs within forty years ....
Section 72-1-9 was written in the wake of the El Paso litigation7' when
it and other statutes were amended to comply with federal constitutional
mandates restricting states from improperly sheltering their water from
out-of-state appropriators. Section 72-1-9 is arguably the clearest
expression which has emerged from the state legislature on the meaning
of public welfare. Presumably, any water use that complies with the
statute's emphasis on long range planning will likely be consistent with
public welfare values. Water transfers from acequia communities to other
uses which violate a county's long range water plan, then, may be
deemed to violate the public welfare. But if a transfer reflects a
"reasonable development and use of water resources," then an acequia
community relying solely on section 72-1-9 will likely be unsuccessful
arguing a violation of the public welfare.
Section 72-9-2 is another statute which is relevant to the search
for the meaning of public welfare in the acequia context. 76 Section 72-9-2
accounts for local customs, rules, and regulations which have been
adopted by the majority of users from a common irrigation system which
promote economical uses of water not detrimental to the public welfare.
The statute reads in part:
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985)
75. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983) (El Paso 1). "Public
welfare" criteria were added to New Mexico statutes after the United States District Court
held that New Mexico's absolute embargo on the export of water out-of-state violated the
U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Id. at 388. In response to El Paso I, the New Mexico
legislature amended the applicable statute to allow new appropriations and transfers for
out-of-state use, but only so long as these out-of-state appropriations were not detrimental
to the conservation of water or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. The district
court then invalidated this amendment because it unconstitutionally applied the
conservation and public welfare criteria to all interstate appropriations while limiting its
application to in-state appropriations. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 703-04
(D.N.M. 1984) (El Paso II). In response to El Paso II, the legislature added the conservation
and public welfare provisions to in-state appropriations in 1985. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23,
-24 (Repl. Pamp. 1985). As a result, any new allocation of water in New Mexico requires the
consideration of public welfare criteria.
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-9-2 (Michie 1978 & Repl. Pamp. 1985).
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In all cases where local or community customs, rules and
regulations have been adopted.., by the majority of the users
from a common canal, lateral or irrigation system, and have
for their object the economical use of water and are not
detrimental to the public welfare, such rules and regulations
shall govern the distribution of water from such ditches,
laterals and irrigation systems to the persons entitled to water
therefrom, and such customs, rules and regulations shall not
be molested or changed, unless so desired by the persons
interested and using said custom or custom ....
This statute may allow acequias to adopt rules and regulations against
transfers of water. For example, an acequia community might pass a rule
that any transfer of water rights out of the acequia by an acequia member
will be deemed to violate the public welfare, "unless so desired by the
persons interested. . . ." Section 72-9-2's presumption that "customs, rules
and regulations" adopted by the community "shall govern the distribution
of water from such ditches" potentially aids acequias in their efforts to
keep water within the ditch community. While an individual's right to
the use of water remains intact, that person's right to alienation is
bounded by the potentially harmful effects such alienation may have on
third parties.
Read together, these two statutes-72-1-9 emphasizing long term
planning, 72-9-2 preserving local community customs and uses-provide
rural acequia communities possible grounds on which to challenge future
water transfers to non-acequia uses and users. Transfers of surface water
rights from rural acequia communities may be deemed to violate the
public welfare if they do not accommodate a county's long term planning
efforts or the rural community's "customs, rules and regulations."
THE PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE ACEQUIA:
RECOMMENDATIONS
This essay makes several recommendations which may ensure
that water transfers will not violate the public welfare. Innovative legal
strategies which attorneys may implement on behalf of acequia
communities (e.g. the creation of community water banks and water
trusts, or the establishment of conservation easements) are not discussed.
Rather, the essay points to legislative or regulatory change which may
enhance community control over its water. The specific recommendations
are: (1) establish a clear burden of proof in transfer proceedings; (2)
clarify the SEO's Intel decision; (3) require of a transfer applicant a

77. Id.
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"public welfare impact statement"; and (4) permit acequias to form
conservation organizations to protect acequia water rights.
The SEO should clarify the finding in the Intel case and not
assume that a transfer which simply complies with New Mexico law's
beneficial use requirement in itself complies with the public welfare
requirement. By doing so, the SEO will acknowledge that the public
welfare is a separate element to be satisfied in transfer proceedings.
According to the logic of the SEQ's position, the public welfare
requirement amounts to superfluous language in New Mexico statutes,
which is something the state legislature likely did not intend when it
amended the various water law statutes. Recognizing the public welfare
as distinct from and additional to beneficial use requirements
is in
7
principles.
interpretation
statutory
basic
with
agreement
In transfer hearings, the applicant bears the burden of proving
non-impairment, conservation of water, and compliance with of the
public welfare.' Yet, given the recent pronouncement from the SEO
from the Intel case, in practice the opponent of water rights transfers
carries the burden of proving a violation of the public welfare. As the
Sleeper case' reveals, the opponents very often are members of a rural
community who share a common reliance on the maintenance of the
ditch system. Legal wrangling over water transfers can become quite
costly, and opposing surface water transfers is often out of the reach of
many rural communities without pro bono legal aid.
The New Mexico legislature should place the burden of proof
squarely on the applicant for the transfer. By settling the burden of proof
issue, New Mexico will provide a better safeguard against the violation
of the public welfare. Presently, there is a strong possibility that many
transfers are approved due to the simple failure of rural communities to
prove a violation of the public welfare, either because of lack of financial
resources, lack of understanding of the ramifications of water transfer
applications, or lack of guidance on what specifically needs to be shown.
Courts and parties to water rights transfer proceedings should know from
the start that the transfer applicant bears the burden of proving
compliance by clearly establishing the burden of proof issue, the
legislature will encourage certainty in the law.

78. See Swink v. Fingado, 850 P.2d 978, 987 (N.M. 1993) ("he prospective application
of a newly enacted act to a [preexisting and ongoing transaction] must also be determined
by the words of the statute, the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, and by the public
policy considerations which are evident from the statute" (citing City of Albuquerque v.
State ex rel. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, 808 P.2d 58,67 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)).
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-7A (Cum. Supp. 1994).
80. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
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How much should the applicant prove in order to withstand the
public welfare challenge? New Mexico should pass legislation requiring
the applicant to complete a "public welfare impact statement," similar
perhaps to the "environmental impact statement" (EIS) made famous by
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1973. Whenever a transfer
of water rights is proposed in New Mexico, the applicant should be
required to complete a detailed statement addressing:
1.
The impact of the proposed transfer on long-term sustainability
of counties and rural communities;
2.
The extent to which the proposed transfer violates or promotes
New Mexico's statutory requirements of conservation and
avoidance of waste;
3.
Any irrevocable and irretrievable commitment of resources, such
as the extent of permanent sacrifice of agricultural land;
Any alternatives to the proposed transfer to achieve the same
4.
result;
5.
The environmental impact of the proposed transfer;
6.
The benefits to the applicant from the proposed transfer;
7.
The benefits to the community from the proposed transfer;
Any other locally important factor.
8.
By requiring the applicant to consider these, and perhaps other, factors
in a document submitted to the SEO and made available to the public,
the public welfare-and the interests of small rural communities-will be
better protected.
A further recommendation to the state legislature to ensure that
surface water transfers do not violate the public welfare is to empower
acequia communities to form a legal association vested with powers to
pass regulations affecting ditch members. With such an organizational
structure in place, for example, any water rights transfers from the
community ditch system would have to meet with the approval of the
community organization. Just as the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District has successfully kept water within its district, an acequia
"conservancy district" could do the same. More importantly, the creation
of an organization comprised of members of the community acequia will
account for the unique social and cultural value given to water by
traditional acequia communities.
At present, New Mexico statutes and court decisions grant
acequias numerous powers, ranging from providing specific rights to
blind acequia members' to the election of officers of an acequia."
82. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
4321-4370(b) (1988)). The requirements of the environmental impact statement are found
in § 102(2)(C) of the Act.
83. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-42 (Michie 1978).
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Additionally, acequias have specific property rights, including the rights
of condemnation,6 inverse condemnationF eminent domain7 and
easements.' More importantly for this paper, acequias constitute
political subdivisions!' and have the power of incorporation, with the
right to sue and be sued.' An additional statute granting acequias the
power to form a water conservation organization which can condition
water rights transfers upon general community approval would not
contradict other New Mexico laws9' and, indeed, would complement
many of the previously mentioned statutes which are designed to protect
the integrity of acequia communities. Given the fact that acequias
constitute political subdivisions with the power of incorporation, the
formation of such an conservation organization will further New Mexico's
statutory protection of these unique cultural and historic entities.
The four suggestions of this essay-settling the burden of proof
issue, clarifying recent findings of the SEO, requiring an impact
statement, and permitting community acequias to constitute conservation
associations-will encourage water transfers that respect New Mexico's
unique cultural landscape. The suggestions will more importantly help
sustain rural communities which have depended on water diverted by
their acequias for hundreds of years. By carrying out these
recommendations, the state legislature and SEO will provide

84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-12 (Michie 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1994).

85. See Young v. Dugger, 170 P. 61, 62 (N.M. 1918) (raising the sole issue of whether
the right of condemnation exists in favor of private persons for the purposes of conveying
water for irrigation over the land of another. The court applied the doctrine of Albuquerque
v. Garcia, 130 P. 118 (1913), holding that the use of water for irrigation of lands, by private
persons, constitutes a public use, and the lands of another may be condemned for ditch
purposes). ,
86. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 467 P.2d 986, 994 (N.M. 1970), the New
Mexico Supreme Court theoretically gave acequias the right to inverse condemnation. The
Kaiser Steel court allowed a corporation to condemn a right of way over adjacent private
property for the purpose of laying a pipeline to transport water from a nearby river, holding
that W.S. Ranch's only remedy was an action in inverse condemnation. According to the
court, Kaiser's actions were unusual but not illegal. Since an acequia has the power to
organize around the development, conservation or management of its water and other
natural resources, if the acequia chose to expand its area of resource management it could

use its powers and property rights to gain new lands. Id.
87. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-5 (Michie 1978).
88. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-5 (Michie 1978).
89. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-28 (Michie 1978).
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-11 (Michie 1978).
91. The issue of whether denying a member the ability to individually transfer a water
right constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution is beyond the scope of this paper. But, consistent with other acequia powers,
most notably the grant to acequias of general easement and condemnation powers, a
conservation organization may be able to withstand constitutional attack. Author's note.
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much-needed guidance on how to enforce the rather nebulous concept of
the public welfare in water transfer analyses. While allowing transfers in
proper cases, the recommendations attempt to strike a balance between
a "community" view of water and a market-oriented, "commodity" view.
Most importantly, however, these measures agree with New Mexico's
water planning statutes by allowing counties and communities to pursue
their own developmental strategies which account for the long-term
interests of rural communities.
CONCLUSION
An underlying assumption of this essay is that acequia
communities possess cultural and historic traditions unique to New
Mexico and to the Southwest. Indeed, the United States Congress found
that "acequia systems . . . have significance in the settlement and

development of the western portion of the United States," and their
"cultural and historic values" merit restoration and preservation.9 As
water is an integral component of the sustainability of unique acequia
communities, efforts should be taken to ensure that water remains within
these communities. This paper explores the notion of the public welfare,
and while it doesn't attempt to define.exactly what the public welfare is,
it nevertheless makes suggestions as to how the New Mexico legislature
and SEO can determine when surface water transfers from northern New
Mexican rural communities violate the public welfare.
These recommendations are preliminary in nature. Other actions
beyond the four discussed above may need to be taken to make the
public welfare component of New Mexico water law understandable and
manageable by water law practitioners. Because the public welfare
equation can vary quite dramatically from region to region, and because
of the unique situation presented by northern New Mexico,' the
ramifications of this discussion are confined to the context of the northern
New Mexico acequia community.
With New Mexico's surface water almost completely
appropriated,9 water transfers are regarded as the answer for
individuals and communities seeking new water. The overall economic
trend of the western United States is one of increased urbanization and
greater reliance on industry. Traditional small-scale agriculturalists are
finding it more and more difficult to survive in an era of free trade and
agro-industry. With hard times getting harder, northern New Mexican
acequia members may be forced to sell their water rights, in turn causing

92. Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4332 (1986). See § 1113, "Acequias Irrigation System."
93. See supra note 14, at 827.
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a "domino effect" of sorts among other members of their communities.
Regardless of the fact that some agricultural water must be transferred to
industry in order to support New Mexico's future growth, New Mexico
should not simply write off its unique acequia communities as a vestige
of times gone by. The state legislature should take measures to mitigate
some of the harsh effects of rapid economic growth on small, rural
communities. Increased economic development assistance to rural
communities, for example, can augment and complement the specific
recommendations above.
The public welfare challenge to surface water transfers provides
rural acequia communities the opportunity to maintain control of their
water, but the opportunity may be lost unless the state legislature and
SEO provide guidance on how to determine violations of the public
welfare. These recommendations agree with the SEO's policy of letting
counties determine water planning goals. Indeed, the recommendations
are designed to strengthen the local and regional planning process by
empowering communities and counties to maintain control of their water
which, in turn, will allow them to decide how and when, and on whose
terms, to develop.

